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RECENT DECISIONS
THE CONTINUED DECAY OF THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE
"It is not difficult to predict a process of development similar to that of
the maker's liability for negligence which will extend first to products invol-
ving a high degree of risk, and perhaps eventually to anything which may be
expected to do harm if it is defective."' The process of development to which
Professor Prosser was referring was that of the manufacturer's strict liability
to the consumer, with whom he is not in privity, on a theory of implied war-
ranty of fitness for intended use and of merchantable quality. At the time
of the statement by Mr. Prosser, this device for imposing strict liability upon
the manufacturer was still in its infancy, and, in fact, had been used almost
entirely in cases involving defective food. In the last six years, however,
manufacturer's strict liability in warranty without privity of contract has
gained considerable momentum. A number of states have since imposed it in
cases involving food and some have even extended it beyond food. A notable
example is that of California, which only recently in Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
Company2 allowed recovery on a theory of implied warranty to a claimant who
had been injured as the result of an explosion of a grinding wheel which had
been sold by defendant manufacturer to claimant's employer. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, however, did not discard the requirement of privity of
contract. Instead it accomplished the same result by holding that plaintiff
employee stood in successive right to the possession and use of the grinding
wheel handed over to him by the purchaser-employer and therefore should be
considered to be in privity to the vendor-manufacturer with respect to the
implied warranties of fitness for use and of merchantable quality. Therefore,
at the outset, it must be understood that California does not at present hold
the manufacturer strictly liable in the absence of privity. Nevertheless the
Peterson case does present an excellent springboard for a discussion of both
the development and merits of manufacturer's strict liability to the consumer.
The traditional view of the American courts that a manufacturer is not
liable to third persons for injuries caused by defects in the product seems to
have found its origin in the dicta of the early English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright.3 The first major decline in this general rule that there is no liability
of a contracting party to one with whom he is not in privity occurred in the
law of negligence. At first, the manufacturer was only held liable to a third
person where the product manufactured could be considered to be inherently
dangerous to human safety. This category of products came to include food
and drink, drugs, firearms, and explosives. 4 Then, in 1916, New York, in impos-
1. Prosser, Torts, 510 (2d ed. 1955).
2. 5 Cal. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
3. 10 M&W 109 (1842).
4. Prosser, supra note I at 499.
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ing liability upon the manufacturer of an automobile with a defective wheel,
extended the manufacturer's liability in negligence to any product which would
become dangerous if negligently made. 5 The latter rule, which has been adopted
by the Restatement of Torts,6 is all but universal law in the United States
today.7 Although MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company8 did not extend manu-
facturer's liability beyond the ultimate purchaser himself, this has been ex-
panded by subsequent decisions, and today the manufacturer's liability in
negligence extends to anyone who may reasonably be expected to be in the
vicinity of the chattel's probable use and to be endangered if it is defective.9
Today a movement is under foot to extend the manufacturer's responsibility
to the consumer even beyond using due care and to, in effect, make him a
guarantor of his product. The tool being used, as has already been mentioned,
is an extension of the strict liability of implied warranty beyond the buyer to
the ultimate consumer. It's progress to date, giving recognition to Professor
Prosser's prophecy of 1955, appears similar to the development of the maker's
liability in negligence.
The decisions imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer have dis-
played a number of legal theories to evade the traditional requirement of
privity. The two theories that have emerged as predominant are that the
original warranty of the seller runs with the title, as in the case of
conveyances of land, and so extends even to a donee of the product.
The other, and perhaps the sounder, is that the warranty is a matter of
strict liability in tort, which does not depend upon a contract between
the parties, and that it arises because the seller, in marketing his
goods, has assumed such a responsibility towards any member of the
consuming public who may be injured.'0
Another theory, which emanates from our principal case of Peterson v.
Lamb," is to expand the conventional meaning of the term privity so as to in-
clude more individuals other than the immediate purchaser within the ambit
of the privity relationship.
On one theory or another, strict liability in food cases, without privity, is
the present law of a clear majority of those jurisdictions which have any definite
law.1
2
5. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6. Restatement, Torts § 395, Negligence (1939).
7. Prosser, supra note 1 at 507.
8. Supra note 5.
9. Supra note 6.
10. Prosser, supra note 1, at 508.
11. Supra note 2.
12. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1107-1110 (1960). Seventeen
jurisdictions now permit recovery against a manufacturer of defective food. In five other
states, the same result is reached under statutes, which either provide a warranty to the
consumer, or are construed to make the sale of defective food for human consumption
negligence per se, even though there is no privity and all possible care has been used.
There are thus twenty-two jurisdictions in all which permit the consumer to recover in
the food product area. Fourteen jurisdictions have rejected the strict liability and continue
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Beyond the area of food, recovery has been permitted as to such products
as fish food,13 Idog food, 14 hair dye, 15 soap, 16 detergent (dictum), 17 and a
permenent wave solution. 18 And in the last few years, the list has been notably
extended to such products as cinder building blocks, 19 auto tires, ° electric
cable, 21 a truck,22 a trailer (dictum),23 an automobile,24 and a grinding wheel.2 5
The second list is considered impressive because it is exclusive of food and drink,
and other articles which could be considered inherently dangerous to human
safety. Thus, this appears to reflect a trend toward extending the maker's
liability in this area, just as the MacPherson case extended the manufacturer's
liability in negligence, to products which will cause harm if defectively manu-
factured.
Unfortunately, however, the doctrine of strict liability is not as universally
accepted as that of the maker's liability in negligence. For instance, as was
witnessed previously, a number of jurisdictions still refuse to accept it even as
to food, and of those who do, many refuse to extend it any further.
California, which recognizes the manufacturer's strict liability as to food,
holds a rather unique position in the non-food product area. It has developed
in Peterson v. Lamb,26 a method whereby a third person is permitted recovery
without actually discarding the requirement of privity. They have accomplished
this result by defining privity as denoting mutual or successive relationship
to the same thing or right of property.
Although this middle of the road position taken by the California Supreme
Court may be looked upon with scorn by the supporters of the movement to
discard the requirement of privity altogether in implied warranty actions, it
is nevertheless an interesting one. It appears to be a compromise between the
opposing ranks in the current struggle to discard the traditional requirement of
privity of contract. By its application the judge could in any given case hold
to hold that the seller of foods is not liable to the consumer in the absence of negligence
or privity of contract. There are two others, North Carolina and West Virginia, which
probably are listed as rejecting the rule although they are somewhat doubtful. In the
remaining fourteen states, there appears to be no definite law.
13. Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
14. McAfee v. Cargill Inc., 121 F. Supp. S (S.D. Cal. 1954).
15. Graham v. Bottenfield Inc, 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
16. Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 19.53), rev'd on
other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
17. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
18. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958),
foreshadowed in Rodgers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958).
19. Spense v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958).
20. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
21. Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d
40 (Fla. App. 1958).
22. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959).
23. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
24. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., supra note 2.
26. Ibid.
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the manufacturer strictly liable or not, depending upon his elaboration of the
word "privity." If nothing else, this writer feels that the use of such a theory
would at least serve as a means of eliminating the curious and indefensible
anomalies brought about at times by the requirement of privity, as where a
meat market which sells pork chops is held to warrant them to the wife who
buys them, but not to the husband who eats them, and for whom they were
bought.
27
Although an elaboration of the term privity in each individual case may
lead to further anomalies brought about by inconsistent applications, it is felt
that such partial protection granted the consumer is at least better than the
absence of any protection which a strict enforcement of the privity requirement
in an implied warranty action necessitates.
While the California decision may be interesting, this writer feels it merits
no other plaudits. One reading the opinion will notice that not once does the
court give a reason, either legal or social, why privity is required at all in this
type of action. The attitude is negative, i.e. none of the cases cited by plain-
tiff support his general proposition that privity is not required. However, this
writer feels that the time is ripe for a more affirmative approach, namely
examine anew the reasons behind the privity requirement. Are they social?
Perhaps society has so changed that it demands a new rule. Are there legal
reasons for the requirement of privity or is this simply a blind adherence to
precedent? As these questions are examined and answered, a subsidiary ques-
tion will be answered, that is, should the courts compromise on this issue as
the California court has done in the Peterson case, or should the privity require-
ment be struck down once and for all as an obsolete barrier to placing respon-
sibility where it rightfully belongs.
It is this writer's view that there are no legal barriers or reasons other
than an adherence to precedent for adhering to the requirement of privity in
regard to a recovery on a theory of implied warranty. As stated by Prosser
in discussing this attempt to make the manufacturer a guarantor of his product:
In the way of such an extension has stood the common acceptance of
the idea of a warranty as something necessarily a part of a contract.
-The preoccupation with contract in connection with warranty has
no sound foundation. The action for breach of warranty was originally
a tort action, for breach of a duty assumed, and it is by no means clear
that it was anything more than the accident that the cases which arose
involved contracts which led to its being regarded as a matter of con-
tract at all. The original tort theory is still very much alive, and a
return to it is still possible whenever the courts choose to find that the
manufacturer has assumed a duty toward those who use his product.
(Emphasis added.)
28
This can be better appreciated when one realizes that the warranty being
pursued is not dependent for its existence upon the affirmative intention of
27. Gimenez v. Great A.&P. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
28. Prosser, supra note 1 at 507.
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the parties but is rather imposed by law for the protection of the buyer. In
fact, even where the immediate purchaser, absent on express warranty, chooses
to sue the maker on an implied warranty, the action cannot be accurately
described as one in contract, i.e. for a breach of a condition to which both
parties agreed, for it is more likely than not that neither party actually con-
sidered themselves as consciously agreeing to the fitness or merchantability of
the product.
As stated in Beck v. Spindler: "Historically, it probably was unfortunate
that the implied obligation assumed by the seller or manufacturer was ever
referred to as a warranty. It could as well have been referred to as an implied
representation of fitness for its intended use, in which event the action would
have continued as a tort action in the nature of one for deceit. 2 9
Even New York, which has been reluctant to find liability on the part of
manufacturers, without privity of contract, even in food and drug cases, 30 has
recognized the tort character of the implied warranty theory where it held that
the breach of an implied warranty was a "defect" or "wrongful act"3' 1 within
the meaning of their Wrongful Death statute.
3 2
The reason for the requirement of privity therefore does not appear to
be legal, unless it can be said that a blind adherence to precedent is a legal
requirement. Although the principle of stare decisis should be and must be
respected by our courts, this does not mean that it should be applied without
limitation. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.133 The words of Justice Holmes
serve to introduce the next branch of our topic, a discussion and comparison of
the social grounds which led to the development of the rule and those of the
present day.
Before going any further, however, one major hurdle must be passed by
those who would impose strict liability upon the manufacturer. That is, why is
not liability for negligence sufficient protection to the consumer? It is true, as
29. Supra note 23 at 560, 99 N.W.2d 681 (1959).
30. Note, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 290 (1959).
Although the latter article is cited for the purpose of presenting the New York law
on the topic under discussion, it is suggested that the reader supplement this article with a
reading of a very recent Court of Appeals opinion decided on March 2, 1961, which held
a grocer liable for injuries to the family of a shopper to whom he sold harmful food. The
decision appears to discard the requirement of privity in New York at least as to food
and household goods and may also be an overruling of the Gimenez case cited in footnote 27.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Desmond, the court stated: "Today when so much of our
food is bought in packages it is not just or sensible to confine the warranty's protection
to the individual buyer. At least as to food and household goods, the presumption should
be that the purchase was made for all the members of the household." Greenberg v.
Lorenz, - N.Y. -.
31. Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
32. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 130.
33. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, 187.
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has been previously stated, that the maker's liability in negligence is almost
universal today. Beside the extension of liability in negligence, various tools,
such as res ipsa loquitur, have been placed in the consumer's arsenal to aid him
in proving the manufacturer's negligence.
Various arguments have been introduced in rebutting the previous challenge.
Among them are that negligence, despite the use of res ipsa loquitur, is still too
hard to prove and that an imposition of strict liability will provide a healthy
and highly desirable incentive for producers to make their products safer. A
skeptic may well question whether the callous manufacturer, who is unmoved
by the prospect of negligence liability, plus res ipsa loquitur, and by the effect
of any injury whatever upon the reputation of his goods, will really be stimulated
by the relatively slight increase in possible liability to take additional precau-
tions against defects which cannot be prevented by due care.
34
What appears to this writer to be the best rebuttal can be simply stated.
In many instances, the manufacturer may simply not be negligent. Neverthe-
less, responsibility for these accidental injuries should be shifted to him who is
best equipped to bear it. We recognize that the latter statement is a conclu-
sion, and attempts to support it will be made later. The point to be made here,
however, is that if the producer is to be required to guarantee his product, no
further justification will be needed than that public opinion, considered in the
sense that it represents the public need, will have arrived at the point where it
places full responsibility for the injury upon him.
Probably the most feasible policy argument in favor of discarding the
privity requirement which, it must be emphasized, the Peterson case did not do,
is the "risk spreading" argument which can be identified with the concurring
opinion of Justice Traynor 35 of California in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Com-
pany,3 6 a case in the food area. Basically this argument is that the manufacturer
should bear the losses caused by the use of his product since he is better
equipped to do so, and through price increase or insurance may pass such loss
on to the community.
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and
guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those
who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet the
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the persons injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and dis-
tributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the
public interest to discourage the marketing of products that are a
menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into
34. Prosser, supra note 12 at 1119.
35. Although concurring, it was not concurred in by the majority which had affirmed
plaintiff's recovery on a negligence theory. The decision, therefore, rests on a negligence
recovery. However, justice Traynor's concurring opinion presents a number of plausible
arguments in favor of the manufacturer's strict liability.
36. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if
he is not negligent,. as the manufacturer of the product, is responsible
for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may
occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their oc-
currence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best
situated to afford suck protection.3 7 (Emphasis added.)
As we have seen, a clear majority of those jurisdictions which have any
definite law have seen fit to impose strict liability as to food, but yet, many, like
California, have been reluctant to extend it any further. Why stop with food?
Dangers to life and health also adhere in other consumer goods that are defec-
tive and there is no reason to differentiate them from the dangers caused by
defective food products. Therefore, as to those who have accepted the maker's
liability as to food but refuse to advance the doctrine any further, this writer
suggests that the same goal of public safety that demanded its recognition as
to food requires a consistent application in the non-food areas where the dangers
from defective products are just as great.
In answer to those who have been recalcitrant to impose strict liability
upon the manufacturer even as to food, it is necessary to examine the possible
reasons which led to the imposition of the privity requirement in the first place
and then to compare the changing conditions which appear to compel a reversal
of the rule.
Various reasons have been given in support of the rule of privity.
One was that the seller's misconduct was not the cause of the damage
to the consumer in a legal sense, because no such harm was to be
anticipated from any defects in the goods, and there was an intervening
resale by a responsible party, which "insulated" the negligence of the
manufacturer. This argument has been exploded long since: if goods
are sold to a dealer, nothing is more foreseeable than that they will be
resold to a consumer, or, if they are dangerously defective, that he will
be injured by them; and the case falls well within the limits of legal
causation. A second reason, which was typical of the social viewpoint
of the 19th century, was that it would place too heavy a burden upon
manufacturers and sellers to hold them responsible to hundreds of
persons at a distance whose identity they could not even know, and
that it was better to let the consumer suffer. 
8
Certainly no one would contest the fact that social conditions have changed
since the 19th century. No longer is the word of the market place one of strict
caveat emptor. This change is evidenced by Judge Cardozo's opinion in the
MacPherson case3 9 of 1916 in New York where the newly recognized responsi-
bility of the maker to use due care was greatly expanded. Since then, the
37. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d 441 (concurring opinion).
38. Prosser, supra note 1 at 498.
39. Supra note S.
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maker's duty to use due care has been extended beyond the consumer to any-
one who may reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the chattel's prob-
able use and to be endangered if it is defective. This was not to be the end,
however. The manufacturer's responsibility, at least as to certain product
areas, has been extended beyond using due care and the courts have recognized
this principle and have given legal enforcement to it by imposing strict liability
upon the manufacturer by use of the device or implied warranty. The trend
cannot be missed nor ignored. The by-word of the marketplace is becoming that
of caveat venditor. It is also to be recognized however that such a drastic legal
change as that imposed by a theory of strict liability cannot come overnight.
It will take time before it is as much entrenched in our legal system as the
maker's liability in negligence is today.
The growth of the manufacturer's responsibility to the consumer is war-
ranted by the difference in their social positions. Marketing conditions have
changed such that the consumer is becoming more remote from the manu-
facturer. Manufacturing processes are either incomprehensible to the consumer,
or, which is more likely, are undiscoverable. The only contact the consumer
has with the maker is usually through high-pressured advertising and the com-
munication media, which advertising is a promise to the consumer, not only that
due care has been used, but that the product is fit for the use for which it is
intended by both parties. Public policy demands that if the manufacturer fails
to carry out these promises, with subsequent injury to the consumer, that the
latter, who has come to depend upon the efficiency of the maker and the ac-
curacy of his advertisement and trademark, should be compensated.
It is hoped that other courts will soon follow the example of New Jersey,
which only recently held the manufacturer of an automobile liable to the wife of
the purchaser who was injured while driving the allegedly defective car. The
court there held that where the products sold are such that they will be
dangerous if defectively manufactured, then "society's interests can only be
protected by eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his
dealer and the reasonably expected consumer.
'40
ANTHONY POLITO
THE IDENTITY OF THE CLIENT-A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION?
Does the protection of the attorney-client privilege extend to the identity
of the client? The decisional law furnishes no precise answer. In 1721, the
Court of King's Bench ordered an attorney to produce his client before the
court in order to rebut opposing counsel's charge that the client was fictitious.'
That this doubtless was the proper disposition of the matter is suggested by the
40. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor, Inc., supra note 24 at 379, 161 A.2d 81 (1960).
1. Gynn v. Kirby, 1 Stra. 402 (1721).
